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Abstract 
There  are  large  differences  in  income  and  education  levels,  unemployment  and  ethnic 
composition  between  neighbourhoods.  An  interesting  question  is  whether  a  neighbour­
hood’s  characteristics  affect  the  behaviour  of  its  residents.  This  paper  investigates  neigh­
bourhood  effects  on  youths’  post  primary  education  choice.  Besides  including  usual  vari­
ables  the  paper  also  includes  neighbourhood  speciﬁc  economic  incentives.  Estimating  lin­
ear  probability  models  as  well  as  multinomial  logit  models  using  Swedish  register  data, 
covering  the  county  of  Stockholm  and  the  years  1988–1992, I ﬁnd  that  both  neighbour­
hood  characteristics  and  economic  incentives  affect  the  choice. For  the  latter  the  results 
are  quite  clear  although  the  size  of  the  effect  is  small:  an  increase  in  the  expected  income 
ofan alternativeincreasesthe probabilitythatthis alternativeis chosen.Forthe neighbour­
hood  variables  the  results  differ  to  some  extent  depending  on  the  model.  The  proportion 
of individuals with at most  compulsory  education in a  neighbourhood does however  seem 
to  have  a  negative  effect  on  applying  for  a  university  preparatory  programme.  The  pro­
portion  of  immigrants  in  a  neighbourhood  tend  to  have  a  positive  effect  on  immigrants’ 
probability  to  apply  for  a  university  preparatory  programme. 
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2  IFAU  –  Neighbourhoods,  economic  incentives  and  post  compulsory  education  choices 1  Introduction 
You do not have to travel far in a city to  notice that  neighbourhoods differ in many  as­
pects.  The  type  and  state  of  houses,  the  cars  parked  in  the  street  or  the  different  languages 
you  may  hear  could  all  tell  you  that  a  neighbourhood  differs  from  another  you  visited. 
These  differences  come  around  since  individuals  sort  themselves  into  neighbourhoods. 
The sorting can, for example, be due to  preferences for  amenities  associated with a neigh­
bourhood,  preferences  for  living  with  some  types  of  people  or  not  to  live  with  other  types, 
or  economic  incentives  (see  e.g.,  Durlauf,  2004).  Whatever  the  reason,  a  neighbourhood 
is  generally  a  poor  sample,  i.e.  not  representative,  of  the  whole  population.  There  might 
be  large  differences  between  neighbourhoods  in  terms  of,  for  example,  income  and  ed­
ucational  level,  unemployment  rate  and  ethnic  composition.  In  Sweden  and  many other 
Western  countries,  the  effects  of  these  neighbourhood  differences  are  an  issue  of  politi­
cal  and  scholarly  interest.  Indeed,  there  is  a  large,  too  large  to  review  here,  and  growing 
empirical  literature  investigating  so  called  neighbourhood  effects  on  individual  social  and 
economic  outcomes.1 
The  understanding  of  neighbourhood  effects  is  important  for  several  reasons.  From  a 
policy perspective  knowledge  is  important  since  it  may  tell  whether  policies  ought  to  be 
neighbourhood/area  based  or  more  general.  The  most  important  reason  is  perhaps  the  self 
reinforcing  nature  of  neighbourhood  effects.  For  example,  if  growing  up  in  a  deprived 
neighbourhood  has  detrimental  effects  on  individual  outcomes  these  individuals  are  more 
likely  to  settle  in  deprived  neighbourhoods  later  in  life.  This  will  lead  to  decreased  so­
cial  mobility  and  the  cementing  of  segregation.  Education  is  an  important  aspect  of  social 
mobility  and  is  one  of  the  many outcomes  studied  in  the  literature  –  often  in  form  of  edu­
cational  attainment  (e.g.  years  of  schooling)  or  achievement  (e.g.  grades),  risk  of  dropping 
out  or  chance  of  graduating.2 
1See  e.g.  Atkinson  and  Kintera (2001),  Borjas (1995), Br¨ annstr¨ om (2005),  Crane (1991),  Cutler  and  Glaeser 
(1997),  Edin  et  al. (2003),  Freidrichs  and  Blasius (2003),  or  Oreopoulos (2003) for  some  speciﬁc  studies  or 
the  articles by  Ellen  and Turner (1997),  Ginther  et  al. (2000) and  Galster (2007),  which  include  reviews. 
2See  e.g.  Aaronson (1998),  Ainsworth (2002),  Cardak  and  McDonald (2004) and Vartanian  and  Gleason 
(1999). The  determinants of educational  outcomes has its own large literature, see e.g. Haveman and Wolfe 
(1995). 
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discrete  choice  models  and  Swedish  register  data  this  paper  studies  the  impact  of  neigh­
bourhoods  on  post  compulsory  education  choice.  Besides  including  usual  neighbourhood 
variables  this  paper  adds  neighbourhood  speciﬁc  economic  incentives,  in  terms  of  ex­
pected  income,  to  the  analysis  and  the  litteratur. 
There  are  already a  number of  Swedish  studies on  neighbourhoods and  education. For 
example,  Andersson  and  Subramanian (2006) ﬁnd  negative  association  between  neigh­
bourhood  characteristics,  such  as  ﬁnancial  resources  and  ethic  concentration,  and  years 
of  education.  Similarly,  Nordin (2006) ﬁnds  that  ethnic  segregation  has a  detrimental  im­
pact on  educational  attainment. In a study of  ethnic  enclaves, Gr¨ onqvist (2006) arrive  at 
this  result  too,  as  he  shows  that  ethnic  concentration  impacts  the  educational  attainment 
of  immigrants negatively. However, Br¨ om (2008) analyses the  impact of  neighbour­ annstr¨
hood  and  school  characteristics  on  upper  secondary  education  (USE)  achievements,  i.e. 
ﬁnal  grades,  and  ﬁnds  no  direct  evidence  that  neighbourhoods  matter. 
This  paper  differs  from  these  studies  in  at  least  two  important  aspects.  First,  it  studies 
educational  choice  rather  than  outcomes.  The  interest  here  is  the  determinants  of  who  is 
applying  for  USE,  rather  than  who  is,  for  example,  graduating  from  USE.  Attainments 
and  achievements  are  important  and  interesting, but it  all  starts  with  the  post  compulsory 
education  choice,  i.e.  you  have  to  apply  for  graduate.  It  is  the  ﬁrst  watershed  towards 
higher  education.  Second,  it  includes  economic  incentives  in  terms  of  expected  incomes. 
In  economics the prevailing view, following Becker’s (1964) seminal work, of  educational 
attainment  is  that  of  human  capital  theory.  Education  is  an  investment  comparable  to  any 
other  investment.  As  such  the  return  and  the  cost  of  additional  education  determine  the 
decision  whether  to  invest,  i.e.  to  further  one’s  education.  One  important  aspect  of  the 
returns  to  education  is  future  income.  Indeed,  empirical  studies,  such  as Wilson (2001) 
and Wilson et al. (2005), reveal that individuals  respond to  economic  incentives, in  terms 
of  future  income,  when  making  their  educational  choices.3 
Human  capital  theory  leads  us  to  expect  economic  incentives  to  impact  educational 
decisions.  What  about  neighbourhoods?  The  literature  propose  several  mechanism,  for 
3These two  studies use a  similar framework to the one used in this paper, although not from a  neighbourhood 
perspective. 
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nity,  through  which  neighbourhoods  may effect  education (Ainsworth,  2002).  The  mech­
anisms  often  involve  ‘role  models’,  which  mediate  behaviour,  attitudes,  values  and  in­
formation.  Neighbourhood  characteristics  shape  the  type  of  role  models  individuals  are 
exposed to  outside the  home. For example,  with few  positive  role models in  their  neigh­
bourhood,  individuals  may  be  less  likely  to  learn  important  behaviours  and  attitudes  that 
lead  to  success  in  school.  Moreover,  lack  of  positive  role  models  may  deﬂate  the  value  of 
such  behaviours  and  attitudes.  Neighbourhoods  may  also  provide  an  important  base  for 
the  perception of the value of  education. The value of an  education is to a large extent de­
pendent  on  future  incomes.  These  cannot  be  known  with  certainty.  Expectations  about  the 
future and how  these expectations  are  formed  becomes  important (Manski,  1993b). One 
way for individuals to gather  information and form expectations is to  observe the  outcome 
of  older  individuals  who  already  made  their  choices (Manski, 1993a). If  these  role  models 
are  conﬁned  to  the  neighbourhood,  neighbourhood  speciﬁc  economic  incentives  become 
important.  Neighbourhoods  may  thus  inﬂuence  educational  choice  directly  through,  for 
example,  attitudes  and  indirectly  through  economic  incentives. 
The  paper  begins  with  a  outline  of  the  Swedish  school  system  and  neighbourhoods, 
which  aims  to  provide  a  brief  institutional  background.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  struc­
tured  as  follows:  Section  3  describes  and  discusses  the  econometric  framework  of  the 
study.  Departing  from  a  random  utility  framework  two  versions  of  the  educational  choice 
is  modelled.  First,  a  binary  choice  of  whether  to  apply  for  a  university  preparatory  pro­
gramme  using  a  linear  probability  model.  The  second  version  is  a  multinomial  choice 
between  discontinue  (not  applying),  applying  for  a  vocational  programme  and  applying 
for  university  preparatory  programme.  The  latter  version  is  modelled  with  a  multinomial 
logit  model.  This  section  also  discusses  the  estimation of expected  incomes. Following 
this  discussion  section  4 describes the  data and the variables  used in the  analysis.  Before 
section 6 concludes  the  paper,  section  5 presents  and  discusses  the  empirical  results.  The 
estimation  results  show  that  neighbourhoods  affect  youths’  post  compulsory  education 
choice.  This  is  true  after  controlling  for  individual  and  parental  characteristics  as  well 
as  neighbourhood  ﬁxed  effects.  Neighbourhood  speciﬁc  economic  incentives  and  neigh-
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bourhood  levels  of  education  and  immigration  affects  the  probability  to  make  different 
choices. For  the  neighbourhood variables  the  results  differ  to  some extent  depending  on 
how  the  choice  problem  is  formulated.  The  economic  incentives,  measured  as  expected 
incomes,  have  an  effect  on  the  choice  regardless  of  model  choice.  An  increase  in  the  ex­
pected  income,  here  estimated  with  neighbourhood  wage  regressions,  of  an  alternative 
increases  the  probability  that  this  alternative  is  chosen.  This  is  a  result  consistent  with 
human  capital  theory.  The  effect  is,  however,  in  some  cases  very  small. 
The Swedish school system and neighbour­
hoods 
The  Swedish  school  system  has  gone  through  substantial  changes  over  the  years,  espe­
cially  during  the  1990s  and a  detailed  account  will  not be given  here, but  rather a  brief 
outline  and  some  aspects  relevant  for  later  discussions.  Readers  interested  in  further  de­
tails  are  referred to  e.g. Bj ¨ orklund  et  al. (2005).  According  to  the  Education  Act,  all  chil­
dren  and  youths  shall  have  equal  access  to  education  regardless  of  gender,  where  they 
live,  or  social  or  economic factors (Skolverket,  2008). To  meet  this  end  all  education  in 
the  public  school  system  is  free  and  there  is  usually  no  charge  to  pupils  nor  their  parents 
for  teaching  materials,  school  meals  or  transports.  Before  the  changes  to  the  system  in  the 
1990s  the  government  provided  earmarked  public  funds  for  the  ﬁnancing  of  the  education, 
although  ‘topping  up’  by  municipalities  were  allowed.  After  the  changes  the  municipal­
ities  has  full  ﬁnancial  responsibility  for  primary  and  secondary  schools.  Another  change 
was  the  introduction  of  school  choice,  which  requires  municipalities  to  satisfy,  subject  to 
space  limitations,  parental  preferences  regarding  school  choices.  The  main  principle  of 
allocating individuals to  schools is, however, still the  residence  principle.4 Due to  which a 
majority  of  individuals  attends  compulsory  school  in  or  close  to  the  neighbourhood  where 
they live. 
Starting at the age of seven, school is compulsory for nine years and follows a national 
curriculum.  The  typical  graduation  age  is  hence  16.  Even  though  voluntary,  a  vast  major­
4N¨ arhetsprincipen. 
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ity  attends  USE.  In  the  1980s  about  80  percent  of  the  pupils  continued,  and  in  the  1990s 
almost  all  (above 95  percent)  continued (Landell  et  al., 2000). USE  consists  of  several  dif­
ferent  study  programmes.  These  programmes  can  be  divided  into  vocational  programmes 
(VP)  and  university  preparatory  programmes  (UPP).5  Like  the  rest  of  the  Swedish  school 
system  these  programmes  where  subjects  of  change  in  the  early  1990s.  One  particular 
change  is  of  interest  here.  In  the  eighties  VP  were  two  years  long  whereas  UPP  where 
three  or  four  years  long.  Besides  differing  in  length  and  curricula  the  VP  did  not  give  eli­
gibility for university entry. In the early 1990s, however, a third year of mainly  theoretical 
studies was  added to the VP  curricula. A completed  programme now gave  eligibility for 
university  studies  as  VP  graduates  now  fulﬁlled  the  general  requirement  for  university 
studies.  In  practice  this  meant  that  some  university  programmes  became  available  for  VP 
graduates.  The  difference  between  the  two  tracks  thus  became  smaller. 
The  neighbourhood  situation  is  quite  different  in  Sweden  (and  Western  European 
countries)  compared  to  the  US.  The  levels  of  ethnic  and  socioeconomic  segregation  is 
usually  lower  in  Swedish  cities (Andersson,  2000).  Moreover,  areas  with  high  poverty 
and  different  forms  of  deprivation  are,  also  in  contrast  to  the  US  experience,  not  located 
in  the  inner  cities.  Instead  it  is  typically  large  scale  public  housing  estates  located  in  sub­
urbs  that  show signs  of  deprivation.  It  is  generally  not  possible  to  classify  neighbourhoods 
as  black,  hispanic,  etc.  as  is  often  done  with  American  neighbourhoods.  The  number  of 
different  nationalities  in  neighbourhoods  with  large  concentration  of  immigrants  is  very 
large  and  effectively  stops  such  classiﬁcation. 
Econometric framework 
When  ﬁnishing  compulsory  education  individuals  have  a  veritable  smorgasbord  of  op­
tions  and  opportunities  to  choose  among.  They  could  discontinue  their  education  and 
start  working  or  do  something  else,  or  they could  stay  in  school.  If  they  decide  to  stay 
in  school  there  are  several  different  programmes  to  choose  among.  Their  choice  problem 
may be  modelled in several different ways. To keep  things  simple, two different versions 
5Yrkesf¨ orberedande  linje  and  teoretisk  linje. 
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down to the binary choice of  whether to apply for a UPP. This  formulation of the problem 
is  interesting  because  it  is  a  ﬁrst  watershed  whether  to  study  at  a  university.  At  the  same 
time,  the  choices  of  individuals  not applying  for  a  UPP  are  treated  the  same  even  though 
there  may  be  substantial  differences.  This  motivates  a  second  version  in  which  the  choice 
set  is  expanded  into  three  alternatives  –  discontinuing  education,  applying  for  a  VP  and 
applying  for  a  UPP.  Both  versions  of  the  decision  can  be  analysed  departing  from  a  ran­
dom  utility  framework  and  similar  formulations,  to  the  one  that  follows,  may  be  found 
throughout  the  literature.6 
Consider  the  following  linear  utility  function,  giving  the  expected  life  time  utility  of 
choosing  alternative  s for  individual  i 
Us = βsXi + δYs + εs  (1) i  i i 
where  the  ﬁrst  right  hand  side  term  is  the  consumption  of  an  educational  good  or  the 
non-pecuniary  value  of  choosing  alternative  s.  X denotes  individual  speciﬁc  characteris­
tics,  e.g.,  individual, family  or  neighbourhood  characteristics,  that do  not vary over  the 
alternatives.  Note  that  the  variables  have  alternative  speciﬁc  parameters,  βs .  If  this  where 
not  the  case  the  effects  would  not  be  identiﬁable  in  estimations  as  they  would  cancel 
out  for  different  alternatives  (see  e.g  Greene,  1997).  It  is  in  this  ﬁrst  term  the  mecha­
nisms  mentioned  above  may  come  into  play, i.e.  neighbourhood  characteristics  affects  the 
non-pecuniary  value  of  education.  The  second  term  is  the  expected  life  time  income,  Yi
s , 
following  a  choice,  i.e.  the  alternative’s  pecuniary  value  or  consumption  of  other  goods. 
The  income  varies  over  alternative  and  have  the  same  effect  on  utility,  δ.  Finally,  the  last 
term,  εi
s ,  is  an  alternative  speciﬁc  random  term. 
Given  the  utilities  of  two  alternatives,  an  utility  maximising  individual  will  choose 
alternative  s over  alternative  k if 
Us − Uk = (βs − βk)Xi + δ(Ys − Yi
k ) + εi
s − εk > 0,  (2) i i  i i 
6See  e.g., Wilson  et  al. (2005)  for a  educational  choice  application  or Wolfe  et  al. (2007)  for a  similar 
econometric  framework  applied to  youths’  childbearing  decision. 
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thus  depends  on  the  difference  in  non-pecuniary  value  between  the  alternatives  and  the 
difference  in  expected  income.  At  the  time  of  the  decision  the  expected  income  is  not 
known to the individuals, however.  Instead they must form expectations about the income 
generated  by  the  alternatives. 
There  are  several  ways  in  which  individuals  may  form  these  expectations.  One  way 
is  to  get  information  from  role  models  or  reference  groups (Manski,  1993a,b).  Individ­
uals  could,  for example,  look  to  their  parents,  friends’  or  classmates’ parents,  or  other 
individuals  in  their  surroundings.  Here  expectations  are  assumed  to  be  formed  using  the 
neighbourhood  as  reference  group.  When  forming  their  expectations  individuals  are  thus 
assumed  to  observe  the  outcomes  of  older  individuals  in  their  neighbourhood  who  have 
already  made  the  post  compulsory  education  choice.  The  choice  of  neighbourhoods  as 
reference  group  could  always  be  contested.  Most  individuals’  parents,  at  least  some  of 
their  friends’  and  classmates’  parents  will  be  included,  however.  Moreover, in  order  to  get 
information  on  all  alternatives  a  wide  reference  group  may  be  needed. 
The expected  income is here  modelled with  means of  neighbourhood and time  speciﬁc 
wage  equations. The wage  equations are, due to  zero wage  income  observations,  modelled 












where  Yo is the yearly wage  income of older individual  o,  εo is a  normally  distributed  ran­
dom  element  of  individual  income  and  Xo = Do, Doao, Doa2,  where  D includes  dummy  o 
variables  for  sex,  immigrant  background,  and  educational  level,  and  a is  age.8  The Tobit 
estimates  allow  income  streams  to  be  predicted  for  different  educational,  combinations 
of  sex,  immigrant  background.  The  present  value  of  the  income  streams  are  used  as  the 
expected  income  of  a  speciﬁc  alternative. 
7It  is  clear  from  this  equation  that  if  βs = βk the  effect  of  Xi cannot  be  estimated. 
8Table A-2,  which  presents  estimations  for  three  neighbourhoods  and  years,  displays  the  structure  of  the 
wage  equations. 
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expected  income  equation. Here the expected income will be estimated ﬁrst and used as a 
explanatory  variable  in  the  estimation  of  the  probability  model  resulting  from  the  utility 
equation.  It  is  hence  assumed  that  the  random  terms  in  the  two  equations  are  independent. 
Identiﬁcation  is  possible  due  to  the  non-linear  nature  of  the  expected  incomes  and  varia­
tion  across  neighbourhoods.  Furthermore,  variables  appearing  in  both  equations  will  not 
have  any clear  interpretation. A third  equation, a  neighbourhood  selection  equation,  could 
also be  added to a perceived  structural  model.  Dependence  between the  selection  equation 
and  the  utility  equation  will  give  rise  to  the  selection  problem  that  riddle  neighbourhood 
studies. If, for example, the  selection  into  neighbourhoods is  based on  some  unobservable 
characteristics, any neighbourhood variables in the  analysis will  become  endogenous, and 
hence  render any estimates faulty, if the  unobservable  characteristics also affect the  educa­
tional  choice.9  The  selection  equation  will  not be  modelled  here, but it  must  nevertheless 
be  considered. 
It  is  useful  to  consider  the  choices,  the  timing  and  the  decision  makers  involved.  The 
ﬁrst  choice  is  the  choice  of  neighbourhood,  which  is  probably  made  by  the  individuals’ 
parents.  This  choice  is  hence  affected  by  the  parents’  preferences  and  characteristics. 
Individuals  may,  however,  effect  the  choice  directly  or  indirectly  by  their  preferences 
or  characteristics.  The  second  choice  is  the  post  compulsory  education  choice,  which  is 
made  by  the  individuals  under  more  or  less  inﬂuence  from  their  parents  either  direct  or 
indirectly.  Individual  as  well  as  parental  preferences  and  characteristics  will  thus  affect 
this  choice.  The  two  choices  may  hence  be  intertwined  and  the  selection  issue  present. 
Leaving  out  any characteristics  affecting  both  choices  when  estimating  the  utility function 
parameters  renders  biased  estimates.  It  thus  becomes  important  to  control  for  individual 
and  parental  characteristics that can be expected to affect both  decisions. Data availability 
sets  limits  to  which  variables  that  can  be  included,  however.  One  way  to  mitigate  the 
selection  issue  is  to  include  neighbourhood  ﬁxed  effects.  These  take  all  neighbourhood 
characteristics,  observed  and  unobserved,  that  are  constant  over  time  into  account  and 
should,  if  the  selection  is  based  on  these  characteristics,  mitigate  the  selection  bias. 
9See  e.g.  Durlauf (2004) for a  more  lengthy discussion of  problems  and  solutions 
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in  the  utility  equation  several  different  models  may  be  ﬁtted  into  this  framework.  Consider 
ﬁrst  the  binary  choice.  This  type  of  choice  is  often  modelled  with  a  logit  or  probit  model, 
and  sometimes  with a  linear  probability  model  (LPM)  (see  e.g., Wooldridge,  2002).  Here 
the  latter  is  used.  The  three  models  often  produce  similar  results  and  the  LPM  is  chosen 
for  its  simplicity.  It  is  simpler  to  estimate,  using  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS),  with  large 
samples.  Including  neighbourhood  ﬁxed  effects  is  straightforward  using  neighbourhood 
dummies. The LPM is also easier to interpret, especially with neighbourhood ﬁxed effects. 
A major  drawback  with  the  LPM  estimated  with  OLS  is  the  possibility  to  get  predicted 
probabilities  outside  the  unit  interval.  This  may  lead  to  biased  and  inconsistent  estimates. 
When  there  are  more  than  two  alternatives,  as  in  the  second  version  of  the  choice,  the 
LPM  does  not  ﬁt  the  bill.  An  often  used  model  for  multinomial  choice  situations,  which 
will  also  be  used  here,  is  the  multinomial  logit  (MNL)  (see  e.g., Wooldridge,  2002).  The 
estimation  of  the  MNL  is  straightforward  save  the  case  of  neighbourhood  ﬁxed  effects. 
When  it  comes  to  ﬁxed  effects  in  non-linear  models  in  general,  the  incidental  parame­
ter  problem  presents  challenges  for  unbiased  estimation  of  parameters,  which  is  also  the 
case  for  the  MNL  (see  e.g.,  Greene,  2002).  These  results  are,  however,  based  on  ﬁxed T 
asymptotics,  i.e.  the  number  of  observations  (often  time  periods)  used  to  identify  each 
ﬁxed  effect  is  held  constant  as  the  number  of  ﬁxed  effects  increases  towards  inﬁnity. For 
large T,  this  problem  disappears. It is, however,  unclear of  which  order T must be to  pro­
duce  unbiased  estimates.10  Here  neighbourhood  ﬁxed  effects  are  included  in  the  MNL 
by  means  of  neighbourhood  dummies.  The  number  of  observations  used  to  estimate  each 
effect  is  the  number  of  individuals  in  each  neighbourhood,  which  should  be  sufﬁciently 
large. For the  reminder of the  paper,  neighbourhood  dummies  will be  used  synonymously 
with  neighbourhood  ﬁxed  effects. 
10E.g.,  based  on Monte  Carlo  simulations  Katz (2001) ﬁnds  conditional  and  unconditional  ﬁxed effects  esti­
mation of a  binary logit to be equivalent for T≥16,  whereas  Greene (2002) ﬁnds  the  bias  decreasing  rapidly 
with T larger  than 3. 
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The  data  used  herein  come  from  the IFAU  database,  which is a  register  based  database 
covering  the  whole  Swedish  population  between  ages  16  and  64. Two  different  data  sets 
will  be  used  in  the  analysis.  The  primary  data  set  covers  most  of  the  individuals  ﬁnishing 
compulsory  education  in  the  county  of  Stockholm,  from  here  on  referred  to  as  just  Stock­
holm,  during  the  years  1988  to  1992.11  Availability  of  data  determines  the  start  year. 
The  end  year  is  due  to  the  changes  of  USE  in  the  early  1990s.  Most  notable  was  that  all 
programmes  were  made  three  years  long  and gave  eligibility  for  university  entry  upon 
completion.  Restricting  the  analysis  to  this  time  period  makes  estimation  of  expected  in­
comes  straightforward  as  there  is  a  clear  difference  between  the  two  tracks.  Furthermore, 
older  individuals,  used  in  the  expected  income  estimation,  will  have  educational  attain­
ment  according  to  the  old  regime.  These  older  individuals  are  part  of  a  secondary  data 
set,  which  is  used  to  derive  some  of  the  variables  used.  The  secondary  data  set  covers  the 
whole  population  of  the  county  of  Stockholm  aged  16  to  64  and  the  same  time  period  as 
the  primary  data  set. 
There  are  some  qualiﬁers  for  inclusion  of  individuals  in  the  primary  data  set.  First,  the 
individuals  must  be  16  years  old  when  they ﬁnish  compulsory  education.  This  is  the  nor­
mal  age  for  graduation.  Second,  the  individual  must  reside  in  the  same  SAMS  (Small  Area 
Market  Statistic) as at least one of their  parents. SAMS are a division of Sweden, made by 
Statistics  Sweden,  into  around  9,000  homogenous  housing  areas  and  will  herein be  used 
as  a  neighbourhood  identifer.  From  hereon  the  terms  neighbourhood  and  SAMS  will  be 
used  synonymously.  Restricting  the  analysis  to  individuals  living  in  the  same  SAMS  as  at 
least  one  parent  may  lessen  the  selection  problem  to  some  extent.  Even  though  it  is  not 
certain,  it  is  quite  probable  that  these  individuals  are  still  living  at  home.  Living  at  home 
implies  that  they have  not  yet  sorted  themselves  into  neighbourhoods.  Third,  individuals 
must have  observations for all variables to be  used.  Besides  missing data,  often  pertaining 
11Even  though  the  database  contains  data  for  the  whole  of  Sweden  this  studie  is  restricted  to  the  county  of 
Stockholm  for  a  number  of  reasons.  The  issue  studied  could  be  perceived  as  a  big  city  phenomenon.  The 
other major cities, Malm ¨ oteborg, are  located in different parts of the country.  Restricting the analysis  o and G¨
the to the  county of  Stockholm  implies that all the individuals face the  same  labour market  conditions. The 
county  of  Stockholm  is  large  enough  to  give  observations  from  all  kinds  of  neighbourhoods. 
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For the  smallest SAMS expected  incomes  cannot be  estimated. Finally, in order to get sta­
ble  expected  income  estimates  a  minimum  neighbourhood  population  of  200  is  required 
to  be  part  of  the  primary  data  set.12  Moreover,  to  estimate  with  neighbourhood  dummies 
there  is  a  need  for  larger  SAMS,  e.g.,  at  least  two  observations  with  different  choices  is 
needed  in  the  LPM  case. 
Table 1 and  Table 2 display  descriptive  statistics  at  individual  and  neighbourhood 
level,  respectively, for the variables  used in the  analysis. The variable  deﬁnitions  are gath­
ered  in  Table A-1.  Before  turning  to  the  variables  it  can  be  noted  that  the  primary  data  set 
contains  69,558  observations  (individuals)  distributed over  669  neighbourhoods.  The  total 
number  of  neighbourhoods  in  the  original  database  is  892  for  the  time  period  of  interest. 
The  smaller  number  in  the  primary  data  set  is  mainly  due  to  the  aforementioned  reasons. 
The  average  individual  resides  in  a  neighbourhood  with  a  population  (aged  16  to  64)  of 
2,410.  The  average  neighbourhood  population  is  1,424,  however. 
4.1  Dependent variable 
Starting  with  the  dependent  variable,  i.e.  the  choice  variable  to  be  analysed,  it  is  based 
on  the  individuals’  applications  for  USE  the  year  they ﬁnished  compulsory  education  as 
follows;  (i)  discontinue  –  did  not apply  for  any programme,  (ii)  VP  –  ﬁrst  choice  is  a  two 
year  programme, (iii) UPP – ﬁrst choice is a three (or four) year  programme. The applica­
tions  are  submitted  during  the  last  semester  of  compulsory  education  and  the  point  of  time 
of  analysis  is  hence  in  the  end  of  compulsory  education.  Individuals  that  discontinue,  ac­
cording to the  classiﬁcation above, may in fact have  deferred  their education. They could 
apply  for USE  later in  their  life.  Around  one  quarter of  the  primary  data  set  did  not  apply 
for any programme, one ﬁfth applied for a VP and the rest (about 53 per cent) applied for a 
UPP. For the LPM the  ﬁrst two,  discontinue and VP, are  considered as  one  alternative. For 
both  models  the  lowest  alternative  is  used  as  base  alternative,  i.e.  vocational/discontinue 
or  ‘not  applying  for  a  UPP’  for  the  LPM  and  discontinue  for  the  MNL. 
12Removing  or  decreasing  the  population  requirement  does  not affect  the  estimation  result in  any signiﬁcant 
way.  The  time  it  takes  to  estimates  the  MNL  with  neighbourhood  dummies  increases  a  lot,  however. 
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Variable  Mean  Standard  deviation  Min  Max 
Dependent variable 
Discontinue  0.2581 
Vocational  programme  0.2066 
University  preparatory programme  0.5351 
Individual variables 
Sex  0.4885 
Immigrant  background  0.1189 
GPA  3.3169  0.6684  1  5 
Expected  income  (binary choice,  1,000,000  SEK) 
Discontinue/Vocational  2.6077  0.6018  0.6742  21.7409 
University  preparatory  3.1720  0.9201  1.0454  26.4514 
Difference  in  expected  income  (binary choice) 
University  preparatory  - Discontinue/Vocational  0.5643  0.4999  -1.7904  12.8225 
Expected  income  (multinomial  choice,  1,000,000  SEK) 
Discontinue  2.2971  0.6210  0.1136  21.7191 
Vocational  2.9772  0.7064  0.1518  23.4190 
University  preparatory  3.4104  1.0955  0.8775  30.0815 
Difference  in  expected  income  (multinomial  choice) 
Vocational - Discontinue  0.6801  0.4527  -4.3201  7.1291 
University  preparatory  - Discontinue  1.1133  0.7449  -3.7243  25.2683 
Parental variables 
Father’s  income  (1,000,000  SEK)  0.2043  0.1545  0  5.6838 
Father’s  education 
Compulsory  or  less  0.2543 
Vocational  0.2242 
University  preparatory  0.2107 
University  0.3107 
Mother’s  income  (1,000,000  SEK)  0.1271  0.0736  0  1.783 
Mother’s  education 
Compulsory  or  less  0.2288 
Vocational  0.3333 
University  preparatory  0.1036 
University  0.3343 
Neighbourhood variables 
Population  2,410.81  2,181.319  203  12,288 
Educationa  0.0231  0.2925  -0.6861  1.1490 
Immigration  (normalised)b  -0.0558  0.4789  -0.7671  2.2329 
Number  of  observations  69,558 
a The proportion of  neighbours with immigrant background. Normalised using the yearly total average. 
b The proportion of neighbours with not more than compulsory education. Normalised using the yearly total average. 
Other,  alternative,  dependent  variables  could  be  which  programme  individuals  are  ad-
mitted  to  or  which  they  graduate  from.  Even  thought  these  are  interesting  in  their  own 
right  they  are  affected  by  several  factors,  e.g.,  the  individuals’  grades  –  if  their  good 
enough  to  get  admitted  –  and  various  events  during  the  education.  Applications  are  more 
likely, even  though they may also be affected by grades and external events, to be the  out­
come  of  an  optimisation  process  and  thus  expressing  an  optimal  choice.  Furthermore,  the 
application  for  USE  is  the  ﬁrst  watershed  for  higher  studies,  i.e.  if  there  is  no  application 
for  a  UPP  there  is  no  graduation  from  a  UPP. 
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Variable  Mean  Standard  deviation  Min  Max 
GPA  3.3058  0.2113  2.54  4 
Expected  income  (binary choice) 
Discontinue/Vocational  2.6298  0.35710  1.6142  7.3171 
University  preparatory  3.1875  0.4158  2.0308  8.5389 
Difference  in  expected  income  (binary choice) 
University  preparatory  - Discontinue/Vocational  0.5576  0.2308  -0.1823  2.1769 
Expected  income  (multinomial  choice) 
Discontinue  2.3045  0.3872  1.3001  7.0783 
Vocational  3.0223  0.4066  2.0193  8.0857 
University  preparatory  3.5229  0.5488  2.1028  9.7166 
Difference  in  expected  income  (multinomial  choice) 
Vocational - Discontinue  0.7177  0.2930  -0.2976  2.2917 
University  preparatory  - Discontinue  1.2183  0.4550  0.1662  5.4038 
Neighbourhood 
Population  1,424.63  1,493.972  208.2  11,521.8 
Educationa  0.0172  0.2939  -0.6500  0.9882 
Immigrationb  -0.1162  0.3784  -0.7199  2.1877 
Number  of  Neighbourhoods  669 
a The proportion of  neighbours with immigrant background. Normalised using the yearly total average. 
b The proportion of neighbours with not more than compulsory education. Normalised using the yearly total average. 
4.2  Explanatory variables 
There are two types of explanatory variables in the  analysis; variables that vary over indi­
viduals andvariables thatvaryover neighbourhoods and time. The former include individ­
ual  and  parental  characteristics  as  well  as  expected  income.  The  latter  are  neighbourhood 
characteristics. 
4.2.1  Individual and parental characteristics 
Individual  and  parental  characteristics  can  be  expected  to  inﬂuence  individuals’  educa­
tional  choice by, in  terms of  equation  1, affecting  the value of  the  educational  good.  They 
may  also  be  expected  to  inﬂuence  in  which  neighbourhood  individuals  reside  and  are 
therefore  important  in  order  to  take  some  account  for  selection.  Included  are  three  in­
dividual  variables;  sex,  immigrant  background  and  grade  point  average  (GPA).  The  ﬁrst 
two  are  dummy  variables  taking  the  value  one  if  the  individual  is  male  and  if  the  indi­
vidual  has  an  immigrant  background,  respectively.  Individuals  are  deﬁned  as  having  an 
immigrant background if they or both their parents are born outside  Sweden. The variable 
thus  includes  both  ﬁrst  and  second  generation  immigrants.  Whether  this  is  an  appropriate 
aggregation  of  individuals  with  immigrant  background  may  always  be  debated.  There  is 
empirical  evidence  that  suggests  differences  in  educational  outcomes  between  ﬁrst  and 
second  generation  immigrants (Szulkin  and  Jonsson,  2007).  The  time  of  arrival  in  Swe-
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this  issue  is  not  the  primary  interest  here  and  that  only  12  per  cent  of  the  individuals  in  the 
primary  dataset  have  immigrant  background  no  further  division  will  be  made.  Anyway, 
close  to  half  of  the  individuals  in  the  primary  dataset  are  males.  The  GPA is  the  average 
of the ﬁnal grades in  compulsory  education, i.e. average grade in the 9th grade.  The  grade 
scale  goes  from  one  (lowest)  to  ﬁve  (highest)  in  increments  of  one.  The  GPA in  the  pri­
mary  data  set  covers  the  whole  range  with  an  average  just  above  3.3.  The  neighbourhood 
average  GPA (Table 2) is  just  above  3.3  too.  The  GPA can  be  seen  as  a  measure  of  ability, 
which  could  affect  the  value  of  education.  Moreover,  the  GPA  can  also  affect  the  individ­
uals’  choices  directly  since  the  admittance  to  different  programmes  are  based  on  the  GPA. 
For  example,  individuals  with  low  GPA could  refrain  from  applying  for  a  UPP,  although 
it  would  be  optimal,  in  the  belief  that  they will  not  get  admitted. 
In  addition  to  the  individual  variables  four  parental  characteristics  are  included  in  the 
analysis,  the (wage)  income  and  education level of  both  parents.  Both  the  income  and  the 
educational level of  parents  are  important  since  these  can be expected to affect the  sorting 
into  neighbourhoods  as  well  as  the  value  of  the  educational  good.  The  income  variables 
are a two year, the year of the observation and the  preceding year, average. In the primary 
data  set  the average  incomes  are  around  240,000  SEK  and  127,000 SEK  for fathers  and 
mothers,  respectively.  The  parents’  income  show  a  large  span  in  the  data  ranging  from 
0 SEK  to  almost  5.7  million  SEK  for fathers  and  1.8  million  SEK  for  mothers.  The  ed­
ucation  level  of  the  parents  is  divided  into  four  dummy  variables  indicating  the  highest 
level  attained; (i)  compulsory  education or less, (ii) VP, (iii) UPP, and (iv) university. The 
last  category is  used  as  base  and is  hence  left  out of  the  estimations. For  both fathers  and 
mothers  about  one  forth  has  only  compulsory  education  or  less.  The  share of fathers  with 
VP  is  about  the  same  as  the  share  with  UPP,  a  couple  of  percentage  units  above  20.  The 
rest  of  the fathers,  some  30  per  cent,  has  university  education. For  mothers  both  VP  and 
university  education have a  share of  one  third  whereas only 10 per  cent of the  mothers has 
attained  UPP. 
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Using  the  secondary  data  set,  save  the  individuals  in  the  primary  data  set,  the  expected 
income is  calculated in two steps. First, Tobit models (equation  3) are  estimated for each 
neighbourhood  and  year.  The  structure  of  the  wage  equation  estimated  can  be  seen  in 
Table A-2,  which  presents  estimations  for  three  neighbourhoods  and  years.  About  3,300 
wage  equations  are  estimated  for  each  version  of  the  choice.13  The  second  step  gener­
ates,  based  on  the Tobit  estimates, expected  income  for  the  alternatives in  the  model.  The 
formulation  of  the Tobit  model  allows  for  income  predictions  for  different  educational 
levels  and  combinations  of  sex,  immigrant  background  and  age  to  be  made.  This  results 
in  predicted  income  for  each  education  level,  s,  and  year  after  16  years  of  age,  t,  Y ˆ
i
s 
,t .  The 
discounted  sum  over  48  years  of  predicted  incomes  gives  the  expected  income  for  each 
education  level,  i.e. 
48 �  Y ˆ s 
i,t Y ˆ s =  i  (1.02)t 
t=1 
where  s is  the  same  as  the  parental  education  levels;  compulsory  or  less,  VP,  UPP,  and 
university.  In  the  MNL  the  two  lowest  levels  correspond  to  the  expected  income  of  the 
corresponding alternatives. In the LPM the maximum of the twolowest levels corresponds 
to the expected  income of  discontinue/VP or  ‘not  applying for a  UPP’. The  last two levels 
are used to derive the expected  income of the UPP  alternative. Upon  completion of a UPP 
the individuals are  eligible to apply for university, which has a value (Comay et al., 1973). 
The expected  income of UPP is  hence not only the expected  income from this level, but 
includes  the  option  value  of  university  studies  too.  This  option  value  is  here  included  by 
letting  the  largest  of  the  two  expected  incomes  be  the  expected  income  of  UPP,  i.e. 
YU PP = max{Y ˆ U PP , Y ˆ university } = Y ˆ U PP + max{0, Y ˆ university − Y ˆ U PP } i i i i  i i 
where  the  last  term  on  the  right  hand  side  is  the  option  value  of  university  studies.14 
13There  are  669  neighbourhoods in  the  primary  data  set  observed over ﬁve  years,  which gives a  total of  3,345 
regressions  to  be  estimated  for  each  version.  All  neighbourhoods  do  not  have  observations  for  all  years, 
however.  This  reduced  the  number  of  regressions  estimated. 
14Whether the individuals  completing a UPP  attends university is a  another problem than the one  studied here. 
It may be  modelled in a  similar fashion, however. The individual will  attend university if utility,  including 
pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary  rewards,  of  doing  so  is  larger  than  not  attending. 
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same  as  the  oldest  individuals  in the  database.  Due  to  this  choice,  pension  payments  are 
not  considered  in  the  expected  income  although  they also  depend  on  educational  choices. 
Given the other  choice made, a  discount rate of two per cent,  income such far into the fu­
turewillhavelittleimpactontheexpected income,however.Boththe numberofyearsand 
the interest rate are arbitrarily set, but this is of lesser importance. Moreover, the  estimated 
income  expectations  are  likely  to  be  biased  and  it  is  of  course  doubtful  that  individuals 
estimate Tobit  models when they form their expectations. The aim is not to exactly depict 
the expectations  formations, but  rather to get a proxy that  captures differences in expected 
incomes  between  neighbourhoods,  alternatives  and  individuals. 
The  estimated expected  incomes,  for  both  the  binary  and  the  multinomial version,  fol­
lows  what  one may expect as the average expected  income is  increasing in the level of the 
alternatives. For example, in  the  binary  case  the average expected  incomes  are  2.6  mil­
lion  SEK  for  discontinue/VP  and  3.2  million  SEK  for  UPP.  This  correspond  to  a  constant 
yearly  income  of  85,000  SEK  and  104,000  SEK,  respectively. For  the  multinomial  case 
the  ﬁgures  are  similar.  On  the  neighbourhood  level  the  numbers  are  somewhat  larger.  The 
difference  in  expected  income  which  enters  the  estimations  is  calculated  by  subtracting 
expected  income of  the base  alternative,  i.e.  discontinue/VP  for  the  LPM  and  discontinue 
for  the  MNL,  from  the  expected  income  of  the  alternative.  If  education  is  proﬁtable,  in 
terms  of  income,  this  difference  should  be  positive.  This  seems  to  be  the  normal  case 
as  the  average  differences  are  all  positive.  There  are,  however,  some  individuals  with  a 
negative  difference. 
4.2.3  Neighbourhood characteristics 
As  discussed  above  there  are  many mechanisms  through  which  neighbourhoods  may  af­
fect  the  educational  choice.  In  the  framework  used  here  neighbourhoods  may,  besides 
affecting  the  expected  income,  affect  the  value  of  the  educational  good.  Neighbourhoods 
differ  in  many aspects,  e.g.,  type  of  housing,  amenities  and  location.  Here  two  different 
neighbourhood  characteristics,  education  level  and  immigration  level,  are  included  in  the 
model.  Here  these  levels  will  be  measured  as  proportions  of  neighbourhood  inhabitants 
(between  16  and  64)  with  immigrant  background  and  low  education  level  (compulsory  or 
18  IFAU  –  Neighbourhoods,  economic  incentives  and  post  compulsory  education  choices �  � 
less),  respectively.  The  neighbourhood  proportions  are  normalised  with  the  yearly  Stock­
holm  proportion,  i.e. 
x jt − xt Ijt = 
xt 
where  x jt is  the  proportion  in  neighbourhood  j in  year  t and  xt is  the  proportion  of  Stock­
holm  in  year  t.  The  range  of  the  measures  are  Ijt  ∈ −1, 1−xt  .  The  normalisation facil­ xt 
itates  interpretation  later  and  neighbourhoods  are  characterised  how  they fare  compared 
to  a  average  neighbourhood  which  would  be  the  result  if  immigrants  and  poorly  educated 
individuals  would  be  evenly  distributed.  Moreover,  a  neighbourhood  with  a  constant  pro­
portion  over  the  years  will  get  a  varying  measure  if  proportion  of  Stockholm  changes. 
These  variables  will  be  referred  to  as  ‘neighbourhood  immigration’  and  ‘neighbourhood 
education’. A neighbourhood  with a  measure of  Ijt  = 0,  would  in  some  sense  be  ‘non­
segregated’.15  Ijt  >  0  implies  that  the  neighbourhood  has,  e.g.,  a  larger  than  average 
proportion of  immigrants  and  could be  considered  segregated. A negative  measure would 
also  convey segregation, but in  the  other  direction.  The  neighbourhood  immigration  mea­
sure  will  in  the  analysis  be  interacted  with  individual  immigrant  background.  The  effect  of 
living  in  a  neighbourhood  with  low  or  high  immigration  may  depend  on  whether  oneself 
has  immigrant  background,  i.e.  whether  the  individual  is  living  among  peers. 
In  the  primary  sample  the  average  individual  resides  in  a  neighbourhood  where  the 
proportion  with  immigrant  background  is  six  percentage  units  less  (-0.06)  than  the  pro­
portion  of  Stockholm,  which  is  around  0.24.  The  the  average  neighbourhood  has  12  per­
centage  units  lower  proportion  than  Stockholm.  Moreover,  there  is  a  wide  spread  in  the 
data  as  the  immigration  level  for  the  neighbourhoods  with  the  smallest  proportion  of  im­
migrants  is  72  percentage  units  less  than  the  proportion  of  Stockholm,  whereas  it  is  almost 
220  percentage  units  larger  for  the  neighbourhoods  highest  concentration  of  immigrants. 
The  variation  for  the  education  level,  which  is  based  on  an  proportion  of  around  0.26, 
is  considerably  narrower,  -0.68  to  1.15  for  individuals  and  somewhat  narrower  on  neigh­
bourhood  basis  (-0.65  to  0.99).  Moreover,  the  average  individual  resides  in  a  somewhat 
less  educated  neighbourhood  (0.02),  with  a  proportion  that  is  two  percentage  units  higher 
15There is a myriad of different  measures of segregation (see e.g., Massey and Denton, 1988). These  measures 
are  not  applicable  here  since they  are  primarily  constructed  for  comparing  different  metropolitan  areas. 
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than  the  proportion  of  Stockholm.  The  average  neighbourhood  is  also  somewhat  less  ed­
ucated  (0.02). 
Besides  entering  on  their  own,  the  neighbourhood  variables  are  part  of  interaction 
terms  that  are  included  in  the  models.  The  neighbourhoods  are  measured  along  two  di­
mensions,  education  and  immigration.  The  effect  of  each  of  these  could  be  quite  different 
depending  on  the value of  the  other. For example, living in a  poorly  educated  neighbour­
hood  may  have  a  different  effect  depending  on  the  level  of  immigration.  To  take  such 
possibilities  into  account  an  interaction  term  between  neighbourhood  variables  enters  the 
models. 
Estimation results 
Both  the  LPM  and  the  MNL  estimated  without  neighbourhood  dummies  show statistically 
signiﬁcant  effects  of  the  neighbourhood  variables  and  the  difference  in  expected  income 
on  the  post  compulsory  education  choice.  These  estimates  are  most  likely  to  suffer  from 
selection  bias,  however.  If  neighbourhood  dummies  are  included  in  the  models  the  num­
ber of  statistically  signiﬁcant variables  decreases. Given the short time span used and that 
we  can expect  some  inertia in  neighbourhood  change  this  result is  not  surprising.  Some 
neighbourhood  effects  nevertheless  survive  the  inclusion  of  the  dummies.  The  marginal 
effect (ME) of one  neighbourhood variable will in most  cases depend on  whether the indi­
vidual has  immigrant  background as well as the level of the  other  neighbourhood variable. 
The  difference  in  expected  income  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  probability  of  applying 
for a UPP as well as  applying for a VP in the MNL. These effects are  present regardless of 
whether  the  models  are  estimated  with  neighbourhood  dummies.  The  inclusion  of  neigh­
bourhood  dummies  should  mitigate  the  selection  bias.  The  estimates  may  still  be  affected 
by  selection,  however.  The  estimation  results  will  now  be  discussed  in  more  detail.  First 
the LPM  results,  followed by the MNL  results. To improve  readability the  number of ta­
bles in  the text  containing  estimation  results is kept low.  Some  estimation  results,  mainly 
different  sensitivity  speciﬁcations,  are  therefor  deferred  to  appendix. 
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pendent  variable:  1=applied to  university  preparatory programme  and  0=otherwise.a 
(1)  (2) 




Neighbourhood  immigrationc 
×1  -0.025∗∗∗  0.054 
(0.007)  (0.045) 




Neighbourhood  educationb×Neighbourhood  immigratonc 
×1  0.125∗∗∗  0.104∗ 
(0.013)  (0.056) 
















GPA  0.34∗∗∗  0.341∗∗∗ 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
Father’s  income  0.08∗∗∗  0.055∗∗∗ 
(0.011)  (0.011) 
Father’s  education  (University  left  out) 












Mother’s  income  0.049∗∗  0.045∗∗ 
(0.022)  (0.023) 
Mother’s  education  (University  left  out) 












Neighbourhood  dummies 
√ 
No  observations  69,588  69,588 
R2  0.326  0.339 
∗ a  Signiﬁcance  levels  0.10,  0.05  and  0.01  are  denoted by  ,  ∗∗,  and  ∗∗∗,  respectively.  Robust  standard  errors  in  paren­
thesis.  All  estimations  include  a  constant  and  time  dummies. 
b The proportion of neighbours with not more than compulsory education. Normalised using the yearly total average. 
c  The  proportion of  neighbours  with  immigrant  background.  Normalised  using  the yearly  total average. 
5.1  Linear probability model 
Table 3 displays  the  OLS  estimation  results  for  two  different  speciﬁcations  of  the  LPM.16 
Speciﬁcation (1)  includes  all  the explanatory variables but  no  neighbourhood  dummies. 
This  speciﬁcation  has  a  fairly  high  degree  of  explanatory  power  with  a  R2  of  0.326. 
Half  of  this  power  comes  from  the  GPA,  however.17  Moreover,  all  the  included  variables, 
save  immigrant background  and  mother’s  education  UPP,  are  statistically  signiﬁcant.  The 
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bourhoods.  Before  going  deeper  into  the  estimates  this  possibility  is  evaluated. 
One  simple  strategy  to  gauge  the  problem  is  to  check  the  selection  on  observable 
variables.  If  the  estimates  are  sensitive  to  the  exclusion  of  variables  that  can  be  expected 
to  inﬂuence  both  the  neighbourhood  and  post  compulsory  education  choice  it  is  likely  that 
unobserved  characteristics  also  play  an  important  role.  Here  the  parental  variables  and 
GPA  are  such  variables.  If  these  variables  are  removed  from  the  estimation  of  the  model 
the  estimated  coefﬁcients  increase.18  This  indicates  selection  on  the  parental variables  and 
GPA.  If  this  is  the  case,  it  is  also  likely  that  there  are  selection  on  unobservable  variables. 
In  addition,  it  may  be  noted,  that  the  direction  is,  unfortunately,  away  from  zero,  i.e.  any 
effects  are  overstated. 
Another  strategy  to  evaluate  the  possible  bias,  following  Glaeser (1996),  is  to  re-
estimate  the  model  using  a  sub  sample  of  recent  movers.  Recent  movers  have  made 
their  selection  of  neighbourhood  later  and  should,  if  there  is  a  selection  issues,  exhibit 
a  stronger  selection  effect.  If  neighbourhood  characteristics  are  more  important  for  this 
group  it  is  suggestive  of  results  driven  by  selection.  If  the  neighbourhood  characteristics 
are  less  important  for  this  group  it  may  be  an  indication  that  neighbourhood  character­
istics  do  affect  the  choice.  Here  the  case  is  the  latter.  Estimation  of  the  model  with  only 
recent  movers  gives  smaller  and  fewer  statistically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients.19 
Taken  together the two results do not give any clear  picture of the  selection  issue. Even 
if they would, they only facilitate an evaluation of the  problem. One  possibility to mitigate 
any selection  bias  is  to  include  neighbourhood  dummies,  as  in  Table 3 speciﬁcation  (2). 
The  dummies  control  for  everything  that  is  constant  over  time  in  each  neighbourhood, 
16A  major  drawback  with  the  LPM  estimated  with  OLS  is  predicted  probabilities  outside  the  unit  interval. 
This may lead to  biased and  inconsistent  estimates. A remedy to this problem is to use a  sequential least 
square  (SLS)  procedure (Horrace  and  Oaxaca,  2006).  This is  an  iterative  procedure;  Starting  with  the  OLS 
estimates  observations  with  predictions  outside  the  unit  interval  are  trimmed  from  the  data.  The  model  is 
then  re-estimated  using  the  trimmed  data  and  OLS.  Based  on  these  estimations  the  data  is  trimmed  again 
and  the  model  re-estimated.  This  is  repeated  until  no  predictions  are  outside  the  unit  interval  and  the  SLS 
estimates  are  obtained.  Estimating  the  LPM  with  SLS  generates  here,  see  Table A-4,  somewhat  larger  (in 
absolute  terms),  estimates.  The  OLS  estimates  thus  seem  to  be  biased  towards  zero.  Given  the  direction  of 
the  bias  this  issue  is  not  pressing  since  OLS  simply  seems  to  underestimate  any effects. 
17Excluding GPA from  the  model reduces  R2  to  0.158,  see  Table A-3 speciﬁcation  (2).
 
18See  Table A-3,  columns  (1)  and  (2).
 
19See  Table A-3,  speciﬁcation  (3).
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such factors  the  neighbourhood  dummies  will  mitigate  the  bias.  Adding  the  dummies  to 
the  LPM  renders  the  proportion  with  immigrant  background  (main  effect)  statistically 
insigniﬁcant.  The  interaction  between  the  two  neighbourhood  variables  interacted  with 
immigrant  background  becomes  statistically  insigniﬁcant  too.  The  signiﬁcance  level  of 
some  other  variables  also  change  although  they  are  still  signiﬁcant  at  conventional  lev­
els.  Even  when  controlling  for  neighbourhood  ﬁxed  effects  there  are  effects  from  our 
neighbourhood variables  on  the  post  primary  education  choice.  The  remaining  coefﬁcient 
estimates  are  similar  to  the  without  neighbourhood  dummies  estimates.  The  R2  has  in­
creased  somewhat,  which  is  not  surprising  given  the  number  of  dummies  included  in  the 
model. 
Recalling  that  the  dependent  variable  is  one  if  the  individual  applied  for  a  UPP  and 
zero otherwise (discontinue/VP) the coefﬁcients tell howmuch the probability of applying 
foraUPP,changeswhenthevariableschange,i.e.theME.Forboth speciﬁcationsin Table 
3 the  probability of  applying for a UPP  increases with the  income of the  parents as well as 
the GPA. Having a father who is not university  educated or a mother with  either of the two 
lowest  education  categories  decreases  the  the  probability,  however.  These  effects  are  all 
between  three and  nine per  cent. For example, having a father  with vocational  education 
instead  of  university  education  would  increase  the  probability  of  not  applying  for  a  UPP 
from,  for  example,  0.5  to  0.57. 
Turning  to  the  neighbourhood  variables  the  results  differ,  as  noted  above,  between 
the  two  speciﬁcations  both  in  terms  of  magnitude  and  statistical  signiﬁcance.  Since  the 
estimates  without  neighbourhood  dummies  are  likely  to  be  biased  the  more  conservative 
estimates  with  dummies  are  perhaps  to  prefer  even  though  they may  also  be  biased.  Re-
calling  that  a  neighbourhood  variable  of  zero  implies  that  a  neighbourhood  has  the  same 
proportion of  immigrants or individuals with low  educational level as the average  propor­
tion,  the  interpretation  of  the  coefﬁcients  is  straightforward. 
For  an  individual  living  in  a  neighbourhood  with  the  same  level  of  immigrants  as 
Stockholm  the  ME  with  respect  to  neighbourhood  education  is  -0.075.  An  increase  in  the 
proportion  of  individuals  with  low  education  of  the  same  size  as  the  over  all  proportion 
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is,  however,  increasing  in  neighbourhood  immigration.20  The  marginal  effect  will  be  neg­
ative  for  neighbourhoods  that  have  neighbourhood  immigration  less  than  0.72,  i.e.  72  per 
cent  higher  proportion  of  immigrants  than  Stockholm.  Thus,  increasing  the  proportion  of 
poorly  educated  individuals in a  neighbourhood  will  generally  decrease the  probability of 
applying for a UPP. In a neighbourhood with high  proportion of  immigrants the effect will 
be  positive. For example, an  individual living in a  neighbourhood  with a  neighbourhood 
immigration  of  one,  i.e.  twice  the  proportion  of  Stockholm,  the  marginal  effect  would  be 
0.04. 
The  ME  with  respect  to  neighbourhood  immigration  depends  both  on  neighbourhood 
education  and  whether  the  individual  has  immigrant  background.21  An  individual  with 
immigrant  background  has  a  ME  of  ﬁve  per  cent  if  living  in  a  neighbourhood  with  the 
same  proportion  individuals  with  low  education  as  Stockholm.  This  effect  is  increasing 
in  neighbourhood  education  and  will  be  negative  for  education  values  lower  than  -0.49, 
i.e.  around  half  the  proportion  of  Stockholm. For  individuals  with  Swedish  background 
an  increase  in  the  proportion  of  immigrants  will  decrease  the  the  probability  to  apply  for 
a  UPP  if  they live  in  a  neighbourhood  with  a  lower  proportion  of  individuals  with  low 
education  compared  to  the  average  of  Stockholm.  If  they  live  in  a  neighbourhood  with 
higher  proportion  the  effect  will  be  positive. 
The  ME  of  difference  in  expected  income  is  about  one  per  cent.  An  increase  in  the 
expected  income for an  alternative would  increase the  probability for that  alternative to be 
chosen.  The  change  needed  to  affect  the  probabilities  in  any signiﬁcant  way  is,  however, 
quite  large. For example, if  the expected  income  for  UPP increases  with  one  million  SEK 
(around  one  standard  deviation),  or  if  the  yearly  constant  income  increases  with  32,000 
SEK,  the  probability  to  apply  for  a  UPP  increases  with  one  percentage  unit.  The  effect  is, 
although  statistically  signiﬁcant,  quite  small. 
20  ∂ P(UPP) 
∂Neigh.  ecu.  = −0.075  + 0.104  × Neigh.  imm.. 
21  ∂ P(UPP)  = 0.051  × Imm.  backg.  + 0.104  × Neigh.  edu.  ∂Neigh.  imm. 
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Table 4 displays  the  MNL  estimation  results  with  all  explanatory  variables  without  and 
with  neighbourhood  dummies.22  There  are  now  two  equations  in  the  model.  Comparing 
VP  and  UPP  to  discontinue,  the  base  alternative.  VP  and  UPP  could  be  compared  by 
subtracting  one  from  the  other. For  reasons  of  identiﬁcation  variables  that  are  constant 
over  alternatives,  which  includes all variables but the difference in expected  income, have 
alternative  speciﬁc  coefﬁcients  (see  e.g  Greene,  1997). 
In  speciﬁcation  (1),  which  is  without  neighbourhood  dummies,  both  neighbourhood 
variables  and  their  various  interactions  are  statistically  signiﬁcant  in  all  cases  but  one. 
In  the  case  of  UPP  the  interaction  between  immigrant  background  and  the  interaction 
between  the  neighbourhood  variables  is  statistically  insigniﬁcant.  There  thus  seem  to  be 
neighbourhood  effects  on  the  post  primary  education  choice.  The  difference  in  expected 
income  is  statistically  signiﬁcant  to.  The  estimation  results  for  the  other  variables  are 
mainly  statistically  signiﬁcant. Two  notable exceptions  are  the  parents’  income in  the VP 
case  and  mother’s  education  in  the  UPP  case.  Moreover,  the  GPA coefﬁcient  is  negative 
in  the  VP  case,  which  is  counter  intuitive.  This  result  may  be  driven  by  individuals  that 
postpone  education.  This  could  also  explain  the  positive  coefﬁcients  of  the  parents’  edu­
cation  in  the  VP  equation.  There  may  be  several  other  explanations.  Here  these  variables 
are  included  to  control  for  selection  and  will  not  be  discussed  further.  The  MNL  estimates 
may  even  with  the  included  control  variables  be  biased  due  to  the  selection  into  neigh­
bourhoods.  Applying  the  same  strategies  as  for  the  LPM  reveals  that  this  may  indeed 
be  the  case.  Removing the  parental  variables  and  GPA  causes  the  estimates  to  increase  in 
magnitude.23  Estimating  the  model  with  only  recent  movers  increases  the  estimates  too.24 
Table 4 speciﬁcation  (2)  adds  neighbourhood  dummies  to  the  model.  As  in  the  LPM 
case,  some  of  the  neighbourhood  variable  entries  loose  their  statistical  signiﬁcance.  Here 
the  loss  of  signiﬁcance  is  limited  to  the  interaction  between  the  neighbourhood  variables. 
22The  MNL  with  neighbourhood  dummies  has  been  estimated  with  different  requirement  on  the  minimum 
number  of  observations  per  neighbourhood.  As  the  size  increased  the  estimates  where  stable  suggesting  that 
the  number  of  observations  to  estimate  each  neighbourhood  effect  is  sufﬁcient. 
23See  Table A-5,  speciﬁcation  (1)  and  (2). 
24See  Table A-5,  speciﬁcation  (3). 
IFAU  –  Neighbourhoods,  economic  incentives  and  post  compulsory  education  choices  25 Table 4: Multinomial  logit  estimation  results,  without  and  with  neighbourhood  dummies.  Depen­
dent variable: post  compulsory education  choice  –  discontinue, vocational  programme  (VP)  and 
university  preparatory programme  (UPP).  Discontinue  is  used  as  base  alternative.a 
(1)  (2) 
VP  UPP  VP  UPP 
vs  vs  vs  vs 
Discontinue  Discontinue  Discontinue  Discontinue 








Neighbourhood  immigrationc 
×1  -1.616∗∗∗  -1.728∗∗∗  -2.354∗∗∗  -1.869∗∗ 
(0.106)  (0.103)  (0.784)  (0.77) 








Neighbourhood  education  b×Neighbourhood  immigrationc 
×1  1.153∗∗∗  2.121∗∗∗  -2.282∗∗  -0.947 
(0.172)  (0.169)  (0.901)  (0.901) 




























GPA  -1.134∗∗∗  1.460∗∗∗  -1.206∗∗∗  1.498∗∗∗ 
(0.035)  (0.035)  (0.041)  (0.04) 
Father’s  income  -0.212  0.766∗∗∗  -0.663∗∗∗  0.201 
(0.184)  (0.161)  (0.213)  (0.193) 
Father’s  education  (University  left  out) 
























Mother’s  income  0.183  0.819∗∗  -0.158  0.422 
(0.354)  (0.329)  (0.401)  (0.379) 
Mother’s  education  (University  left  out) 
























Neighbourhood  dummies 
√ 
No  observations  69,200  69,200 
Log  likelihood  -27,805.45  -2565-3.14 
a  Signiﬁcance levels  -0.10,  -0.05  and  -0.01  are  denoted by  ∗ ,  ∗∗,  and  ∗∗∗,  respectively.  All  estimations  include  a  constant 
and  time  dummies. For  reasons  of  identiﬁcation  variables  that do  not vary  over  alternatives have  alternative  speciﬁc 
coefﬁcients. 
b The proportion of neighbours with not more than compulsory education. Normalised using the yearly total average. 
c  The  proportion of  neighbours  with  immigrant  background.  Normalised  using  the yearly  total average. 
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in  the  UPP  equation  the  main  effect  looses  its  signiﬁcance.  The  estimated  coefﬁcients 
increase  somewhat  in  magnitude  except  in  the  case  of  neighbourhood  education.  In  the 
VP equation the coefﬁcient  increases  threefold. In the UPP equation there is a sign change 
in  addition  to  a  large  increase  in  the  magnitude  of  the  coefﬁcient.  Again,  these  estimates 
may  also  be  biased, but  probably  less  likely  than  the  without  neighbourhood  dummies 
estimates. For the  rest of the variables  there  are  some  small  changes in the  estimates and 
some  signiﬁcance levels.  Most  notable is  the  change of  equation by father’s  income  from 
UPP  to  VP. 
The  MNL  is  not  as  straightforward  to  interpret  as  the  LPM.  The  marginal  effects  will 
not  only  depend  on  the values of  all  other variables, but  also  the  probability of  choos­
ing the  alternatives and may in fact be of a different sign than the coefﬁcients (see  e.g., 
Wooldridge,  2002). Table 5 displays  the  average  marginal  effect  (AME)  for  the  variables 
of  greatest  interest  based  on  the  MNL  with  neighbourhood  dummies.25  The  AME:s  ex­
press  the  average  change  in  the  probability  of  choosing  the  different  alternatives,  i.e.  VP 
and  UPP.  In  addition,  the  table  displays  the  statistical  signiﬁcance  of  the  underlying  indi­
vidual  ME:s  within  brackets.  This  is  expressed  as  the  percentage  of  ME:s  that  are;  neg­
ative,  insigniﬁcant  and  positive  at  ﬁve  per  cent  signiﬁcance  level.  Moreover,  the  AME:s 
are  displayed  for  four  groups  based  on  sex  and  immigrant  background. 
Only  nine  out  of  24  AME:s  are  statistically  signiﬁcant  –  neighbourhood  immigration 
in  the  case  of  females  with  immigrant  background  and  all  difference  in  expected  income 
AME:s. For all variables the  individual  ME:s may give  some  information of  possible ef­
fects,  however.  Even  though  the  AME:s  are  insigniﬁcant  for  neighbourhood  education  a 
majority  of  the  the  individual  ME:s  is  positive  in  the  VP  case.  An  increase  in  the  neigh­
bourhood  proportion  of  individuals  with  low  education  will  thus  increase  the  probability 
to  apply  for  a  VP  for  a  majority  of  the  individuals.  Furthermore,  no  individuals  have  neg­
ative  ME:s  with  respect  to  neighbourhood  education.  In  the  UPP  case  the  distribution  of 
individual  ME:s  are  much  more  even  and  not  much  can  be  deduced  from  the  estimations. 
25Based  on  Table 4 speciﬁcation (2) ME:s have been  calculated for all individuals. The AME:s are the average 
of  these. 
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a  Based  on  the  estimates  in  Table 4.  Signiﬁcance  levels  0.10,  0.05  and  0.01  are  denoted by  ∗ ,  ∗∗,  and  ∗∗∗,  respectively. 
Standard  errors  in  parenthesis.  In  brackets,  percentage  of  individual  marginal  effects  that  are  statistically  signiﬁcant, 
[-,0,+]  at  0.05  signiﬁcance  level. 
b The proportion of neighbours with not more than compulsory education. Normalised using the yearly total average. 
c  The  proportion of  neighbours  with  immigrant  background.  Normalised  using  the yearly  total average. 
Asimilar pattern occurfor neighbourhood immigration, althoughwithadifferentsign.No 
individuals  have  positive  ME:s  in  the  case  of  VP  and  a  majority  of  individuals  with  im­
migrant  background has  negative  ME:s.  Thus  an  increase  in  the  proportion  of  immigrants 
will  reduce the  probability to  apply for a VP in  general. For  individuals  with  Swedish 
background  about  one  third  has  negative  ME:s. For  females  with  immigrant  background 
the  AME  is  negative  and  statistically  signiﬁcant  in  the  UPP  case.  The  individual  ME:s  are 
rather evenly  distributed, however. For  the  other  groups  the  ME:s  are evenly  distributed 
too.  Individuals  with  Swedish  background  seem  to  be  less  affected  as  a  majority  has  in­
signiﬁcant  ME:s. 
The  difference  in  expected  income  has  positive  and  statistically  signiﬁcant  AME:s  all 
over.Theeffectis considerablysmallerforVP,atmostahalfpercent,comparedtoUPP,at 
most  58  per  cent.  An  one  million  SEK  increase  in  the  expected  income  will  thus  increase 
the  probability to  choose a VP with  about a  half  percentage  unit and 50  percentage  units 
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to  choose a UPP,  respectively. For VP the effect is  hence very  small, in par  with the  linear 
probability  model. For UPP the effect is, however,  sizeable and even  small  changes to 
expected  incomes  may  matter. A majority  of  the  individuals,  around  three  fourths  of  the 
females  and  around  90  per  cent  of  the  males,  have  positive  ME:s.  Moreover,  females  have 
twice  the  AME  of  males  and  individuals  with  immigrant  background  have  larger  AME 
then  individuals  with  Swedish  background.  An  increase  in  the  expected  income  of  an 
alternative  increases  (in  average)  the  probability  that  this  alternative  is  chosen,  which  is 
of  course  what  can  be  expected. 
Concluding remarks 
The  estimation  results  show  that  neighbourhoods  affect  youths’  post  compulsory  educa­
tion  choice.  This  is  true  after  controlling  for  individual  and  parental  characteristics  as  well 
as  neighbourhood  ﬁxed  effects.  Neighbourhood  speciﬁc  economic  incentives  and  neigh­
bourhood  levels  of  education  and  immigration  affects  the  probability  to  make  different 
choices. 
For  the  neighbourhood  variables  the  results  differ  to  some  extent  depending  on  how 
the  choice  problem is  formulated. If the  choice is  formulated as a binary  choice of  whether 
to  apply  for  a  university  preparatory  programme  the  probability  of  applying  for  such  a 
programme  is  generally  decreasing  in  the  neighbourhood  proportion  of  individuals  with 
at most  compulsory  education. For a neighbourhood with a high  proportion of  immigrants 
(somewhat  less  than  twice  the  proportion  of  Stockholm)  the  effect  is  the  opposite.  One 
possible explanation for this is that the  linear  probability  model works best  around  means. 
Another,  more  appealing, explanation is that  education may be viewed as a way to  escape 
neighbourhoods  with  high  proportion  of  immigrants  and  individuals  with  low  education. 
The  effect  of  immigrant  concentration  on  the  binary  choice  depends  on  whether  the 
youth has  immigrant  background. For a youth with  Swedish  background living in a neigh­
bourhood  with  higher  proportion  of  individuals  with  low  education  that  the  average  in 
Stockholm,  the  proportion  of  immigrants  has  a  positive  effect  on  the  probability  to  apply 
IFAU  –  Neighbourhoods,  economic  incentives  and  post  compulsory  education  choices  29 for a  university  preparatory  programme. For  more  educated  neighbourhoods  the  proba­
bility  to  apply  for  a  university  preparatory  programme  decreases  when  the  proportion  of 
immigrants  increases.  If  the  youth  has  immigrant  background  the  effect  of  the  propor­
tion  of  immigrants  on  the  probability  to  apply  for  a  university  preparatory  programme  is 
generally  positive.  This  is  in  contrast  to  previous  research  on  Swedish  data.  One  possible 
explanation  is  that  there  is  a  discrepancy between  applications  (this  paper)  and  outcomes 
(previous  research).  If  this  is  the  case  is  an  interesting  future  research  topic. Yet  another 
interesting  topic  for  the  future  is  if  there  are  differences  between  ﬁrst  and  second  genera­
tion  immigrants.  Here  both  generations  have  been  included  in  immigrant  background. 
If  the  choice  is  formulated  as  a  multinomial  choice  between  not  applying,  applying 
for  a  vocational  programme  or  applying  for  a  university  preparatory  programme,  the  ef­
fect  of  the  neighbourhood  variables  are  less  clear.  In  most  cases  the  average  marginal 
effects are  statistically insigniﬁcant. The individual marginal effects do however point in 
certain  directions. For a  majority of the individuals the  probability to apply for a voca­
tional  programme  increases  if  the  proportion  of  individuals  with  low  education  increases. 
The  marginal  effects  on  applying  for  a  university  preparatory  programme  are  much  more 
evenly  distributed  and  not  much  can be  deduced  from  the  estimations. For  the  proportion 
of  immigrants  the  effects  on  the  probability  to  apply  for  a  vocational  programme  are  in 
general  negative.  An  increase  in  the  proportion  of  immigrants  will  hence  reduce  the  prob­
ability  to  apply  for  a  vocational  programme.  Again  not  much  can  be  deducted  regarding 
university  preparatory  programme  applications.  These  results  are  in  line  with  the  linear 
probability  model,  however.  The  effects  on  vocational  programme  are  the  opposite  of  the 
general  effects  on  university  preparatory  programme  in  the  linear  probability  model. 
Regardless  of  whether  the  problem  is  speciﬁed  as  a  binary  choice  or  as  a  multinomial 
choice  economic  incentives,  measured  as  expected  incomes,  have  an  effect  on  the  choice. 
An  increase  in  the  expected  income,  here  estimated  with  neighbourhood  wage  regres­
sions,  of  an  alternative  increases  the  probability  that  this  alternative  is  chosen.  This  is  a 
result  consistent  with  human  capital  theory.  The  magnitude  of  the  effects  differ  with  the 
problem  formulation,  however,  and  is  very  small  for  some  cases.  One  interesting  results 
with  respect  to  expected  income  is  that  females  have  considerably  larger  marginal  effects 
30  IFAU  –  Neighbourhoods,  economic  incentives  and  post  compulsory  education  choices in  the  multinomial  speciﬁcation.  Moreover,  individuals  with  immigrant  background  also 
show  larger  marginal  effects.  The  estimation  of  the  expected  incomes  may  however  be 
challenged.  It  is  of  course  questionable  if  youths  collect  information  about  different  edu­
cational  payoffs  from  their  neighbours.  There  are  other  possible  reference  groups,  such  as 
parents  and  friends’  parents.  The  path  taken  in  this  paper  does  however  require  a  certain 
group  size  in  order  for  the  expected  incomes  to  be  estimable.  As  usual  data  effectively  set 
constraints.  Alternative  approaches  are  left  to  future  research.  The  difference  in  marginal 
effects  between  different  groups  is  also  an  interesting  future  research  topics. 
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Table A-1: Variable  deﬁnitions 
Variable  Deﬁnition 
Dependent variable  � 
Binary choice  = 
0 if  ﬁrst  choice  is  a  university  preparatory programme  (base  alternative) 
1 if  discontinue,  i.e.  did  not  apply  or  if  ﬁrst  choice  is  a  vocational  programme  ⎧ 
⎪ ⎨0 if  discontinue,  i.e.  did  not  apply 
Multinomial  choice  = 
⎪ ⎩ 
1 if  ﬁrst  choice  is  a  vocational  programme 
2 if  ﬁrst  choice  is  a  university  preparatory programme  (base  alternative) 
Individual variables 
Sex  1 if  male,  0 if  female 
Immigrant  background  1 if  oneself  or  both  parents  are  born  outside  Sweden 
GPA  GPA when  ﬁnishing  grade  9 (possible  grades  1. . . 5) 
Expected  income  the  discounted  sum  of  predictions  from  neighbourhood  and  year 
speciﬁc  tobit  regressions  in  1,000,000  SEK 
Difference  in  expected  income  the  difference  in  expected  income  between  an  alternative  and  the  base  alternative 
Parental variables 
Father’s  (mother’s)  income  father’s  (mother’s)  average  labour  income  last  two  years  in  1,000,000  SEK 
Father’s  (mother’s)  education 
Compulsory  or  less  1 if  compulsory education  or  less 
Vocational  1 if  vocational  programme 
University  preparatory  1 if  university  preparatory programme 
University  reference  group,  more  than  upper  secondary education 
Neighbourhood variables 
Neighbourhood  education  Proportion  of  neighbourhood  population  with  a  given  year  with  at  most  compulsory 
education.  Normalised  using  the  overall  proportion  that  year.a 
Neighbourhood  immigration  Proportion  of  neighbourhood  population  a  given  year  with  immigrant  background. 
Normalised  using  the  overall  proportion  that  year.a 
x jt −xt a  The  normalisation is  made in  the following way.  Ijt  =  where  x jt is  the  proportion in  neighbourhood  j year t and  xt 
xt  is  the  proportion in  the  secondary data  set year  t. 
IFAU  –  Neighbourhoods,  economic  incentives  and  post  compulsory  education  choices  35 Table A-2: Neighbourhood wage  equation Tobit  estimates for  three  neighbourhoods  (SAMS)  and 
years.  Dependent  variable  wage  income  in  100  SEK.a 
SAMS  1170022  SAMS  1250015  SAMS  1910001 
Year  1989  Year  1990  Year  1991 
Sex  1119.585  304.345  1297.227∗∗ 
(961.989)  (740.019)  (603.093) 












VP  2723.208∗∗  506.071  802.717 
(1320.656)  (1181.805)  (907.590) 
UPP  1491.363  -1157.221  1587.320 
(1572.229)  (1350.609)  (1038.896) 
























Sex×VP  343.645  -244.238  -88.401 
(288.077)  (247.036)  (176.432) 
Sex×UPP  -414.011∗  -715.165∗∗∗  -466.186∗∗∗ 
(244.905)  (220.576)  (160.959) 














































































Number  of  observations  282  565  1,059 
∗ a  Signiﬁcance levels  0.10,  0.05  and  0.01  are  denoted by  ,  ∗∗,  and  ∗∗∗,  respectively.  All  estimations  include  a  constant. 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table A-4: Linear  probability  model  sequential  least  squares  estimates,  without  and  with  neigh­
bourhood  dummies.a  Dependent  variable:  1=applied  to  university  preparatory  programme  and 
0=otherwise.b 
(1)  (2) 




Neighbourhood  immigrationd 
×1  -0.026∗∗∗  0.024 
(0.008)  (0.054) 




Neighbourhood  educationc×Neighbourhood  immigrationd 
×1  0.153∗∗∗  0.166∗∗ 
(0.015)  (0.071) 
















GPA  0.438∗∗∗  0.451∗∗∗ 
(0.003)  (0.004) 
Father’s  income  0.122∗∗∗  0.102∗∗∗ 
(0.015)  (0.016) 
Father’s  education  (University  left  out) 












Mother’s  income  0.085∗∗∗  0.08∗∗∗ 
(0.028)  (0.029) 
Mother’s  education  (University  left  out) 












Neighbourhood  dummies 
√ 
No  observations  57,352  55,877 
R2  0.258  0.264 
a  The  sequential  least  square  procedure  contains  the following  steps;  Estimate  the  LPM  with  OLS.  Remove  observations 
with  prediction  outside  the  unit  interval.  Repeat  these  two  steps  until  no  observations  are  removed.  See  Horrace  and 
Oaxaca (2006) for  more  information. 
∗ b Signiﬁcance  levels  0.10,  0.05  and  0.01  are  denoted by  ,  ∗∗,  and  ∗∗∗,  respectively.  Robust  standard  errors  in  paren­
thesis.  All  estimations  include  a  constant  and  time  dummies. 
c  The  proportion of  neighbours  with  not  more  than  compulsory education.  Normalised  using  the yearly  total average. 
d The proportion of  neighbours with immigrant background. Normalised using the yearly total average. 
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